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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PlaintifflAppellee,
v.
*

Case No. 970181-CA

*

Priority No. 2

EDWARD SMITH,
Defendant\Appellant
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from a conviction of one count of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony
in violation of U.C.A. §76-3-302 (1953, As Amended). The Appellant was convicted of the above
charge after a jury trial, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor presiding. The appellant was tried in the
Second District Court of Weber County on the 5th and 6th days of September, 1996.
On October 11, 1996, the Defendant was sentenced to serve one term of five years to life on
the conviction of Aggravated Robbery. The court also enhanced the Defendant's sentence for a term
of zero to five years, to be served consecutively, pursuant to U.C.A. §76-6-203. The Appellant
appeals the enhanced sentence imposed pursuant to U.C.A. §76-6-203 for use of a Dangerous
weapon.
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Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal was conferred upon the Supreme Court of Utah
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2-2(3)(I) 1953, as amended) and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The Utah Supreme Court exercised its authority and poured the case over to the Utah
Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL,
STANDARD OF REVIEW & CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
POINT I
The Defendant's constitutional right to be free from Double Jeopardy was violated when the
trial court imposed an enhanced sentence for using & "dangerous weapon" when using a dangerous
weapon was already part of the offense for which the Appellant was convicted.
Standard of Review
Constitutional issues are a question of law. The trial court's determination of questions of
law are given no deference and are reviewed by this court for correctness. State v. Thurman. 846
P.2d 1256, 1271.
Citation to the Record
The Defendant properly objected to the imposition of the enhancement on the issue of Double
Jeopardy. (T. Sentencing 14-31)
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POINT II
The Trial Court committed reversible error when it failed to allow a cautionary jury
instruction requested by the Defendant regarding oral admissions.
Standard of Review
An appeal challenging the refusal to give a jury instruction presents a question of law for
which no particular deference is granted. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. V. 11th Avenue Corp.. 850 P.2d
447, 452 (Utah 1993). An Appellate Court will review the trial court's instructions under a
correction of error standard. Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). Failure to give
requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error only if their omission tends to mislead the jury
to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law
Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987).
Citation to the Record
The Defendant properly objected to the Court modifying the jury instruction. (T. Trial Vol.
II, 85)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb: nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
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UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE L SECTION 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusations against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall nottoe-compelledto testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 76-3-203
(Prior to 1995 Amendment)
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as follows:
(1)
In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than five years, unless
otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm
or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the
felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(2)
In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less than one year nor
more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a
firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to
run consecutively and not concurrently;
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Secticrn 76-3-203
(As amended effective May 1, 1995)
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as follows:
(1)
In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than five years, unless
otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be for life but if the trier of fact finds a
dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the representation of a dangerous weapon, as provided in Section
76-1-601. was used in the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(2)
In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less than one year nor
more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the
representation of a dangerous weapon as provided in Section 76-1-60L was used in the commission
or furtherance of a felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and.the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.

Section 76-6-301
(Robbery)
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a)
the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by
means offeree or fear; or
(b)
the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against
another in the course of committing a theft.
(2)
An act shall be considered "in the course of committing a theft" if it occurs in an attempt to
commit theft, commission of theft, or in th^ immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
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Section 76-6-302
(Aggravated Robbery)
(1)

(2)
(3)

A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a)
uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601;
(b)
causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c)
takes an operable motor vehicle.
Aggravated robbery is a first degree felofiy.
For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing
a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant was convicted of one count of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony. At
trial, an investigating officer from the FBI testified that the Appellant admitted to the crime. At the
close of evidence, the Appellant's trial attorney requested that the trial court give a cautionary jury
instruction regarding oral admissions. The trial court struck the last sentence of the requested
instruction before giving it to the jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the Appellant was
sentenced to serve a term of five years to life on the charge of Aggravated Robbery.
The trial court enhanced the Appellant's sentence pursuant to U.C. A. §76-3-203 (Amended
1995). The enhancement for the use of a dangerous weapon was a direct violation of the Appellant's
right against double jeopardy. The Appellant was convicted of a first degree felony rather than a
second degree felony, because of his use of a dangerous weapon. The court then enhanced his
sentence for the use of the same dangerous weapon. This double punishment, for the use of a
dangerous weapon, was a violation of the Appellant's right against double jeopardy.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 17, 1995 at approximately 11:45 p.m. two individuals entered the Wendy's restaurant
through a back door. (T. Vol. I, pp. 14, 15, 40) One of the individuals was armed with a long rifle,
and the other was armed with a pistol. (T. Vol. I, pp. 16, 21, 42, 47) At gunpoint, the employees
were instructed to retrieve moneyfroma safe and deliver it to the two suspects. The individuals then
left the Wendy's. The Ogden City Police Department responded to the scene, and began an
investigation into the robbery. (T. Vol. I, p 56) .
On June 25, 1997 the Federal Bureau of Investigations (hereinafter "FBI") and some local law
enforcement agencies were working a "storefront" operation in Davis County. (T. Vol. I, pp 61-62)
The storefront operation had no connection to the Wendy's investigation. As a result of the
storefront, FBI Agent Robert Evans met the Defendant. (T. Vol. I, p. 63) At trial, the FBI agent
testified that the Appellant believed the agent to be a gangster. (T. Vol. I, p. 80) On June 25, 1995,
while riding with Agent Evans from Layton to Salt Lake, the Defendant allegedly told Agent Evans
that he and another individual by the name of Shane Searle committed a robbery of a Wendy's
restaurant. (T. Vol. I, pp. 67-69)
Agent Evans further testified that, after the Appellant's arrest on December 5, 1995, the
Appellant again confessed to the robbery. (T. Vol. I, pp. 115-117) The admissions were not tape
recorded, nor were they reduced to writing and signed by the Appellant. (T. Vol. I, pp 117-118)
Prior to jury deliberations, the Appellant's attorney, Martin Gravis, requested that a
cautionary jury instruction regarding oral admissions be given to the jury. The trial court allowed only
an edited version of the instruction to be given to the jury. The edited version did not caution the jury
regarding the unreliability of oral admissions. (J. Vol. II, p. 85)
7

Prior to the Appellant's trial and sentencing, the legislature amended the firearm enhancement
statute, U.C.A. §76-3-203(1). The amendment ^changed the statute to allow an enhancement of a
sentence if it was found that a "dangerous weapon" was used in the commission of a felony. The
prior statute allowed for an enhanced sentence only if a "firearm" had been used in the commission
of a felony.
The Appellant was convicted of the Aggravated Robbery based upon his use of a "dangerous
weapon" in the course of the robbery, and he was sentenced to serve a term of five years to life. The
Appellant was also sentence to an enhanced term of zero to five years pursuant to U.C.A. §76-3-203
for the use of the same "dangerous weapon". (T. Sentencing, p. 30)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed reversible error when it amended the proposed jury instruction
submitted by the defense. Failure of the trial court to give the proposed instruction caused the jury
to give undue weight to the oral admissions proffered by the officers. The cautionary instruction
would have instructed the jury to use caution when considering an alleged oral admission.
The Appellant's right to be free from double jeopardy was violated when he was subjected
to an enhanced sentence under the dangerous weapon enhancement, U.C.A. §76-2-203. The
Appellant was convicted of a first degree felony rather than a second degree felony, because of his
use of a "dangerous weapon". The Appellant was further penalized for the same act when his
sentence was enhanced for the use of the same "dangerous weapon".
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ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
FREE FROM DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS VIOLATED WHEN
THE TRIAL COURT IMPQSED AN ENHANCEMENT TO
THE APPELLANT'S SENTENCE FOR USING A
"DANGEROUS WEAPON" \yHEN USING A DANGEROUS
WEAPON WAS A ALREADY PART OF THE OFFENSE FOR
WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution guarantee persons
charged with a criminal offense the right to be free from double jeopardy. See U.S. Const. Amend.
V; Utah Const. Art. L Section 12. The double jeopardy clause not only protects individuals against
a second prosecution for the same offense, it also protects against a second punishment for the same
offense. United States v. Bizzel. 921 F.2d 263 (10th cir. 1990); Grady v. Corbin. 495 U.S. 508, 110
S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed 548 (1990).
In the case at bar, the Defendant was subjected to a penalty enhancement pursuant to U.C.A.
§76-3-203, due to his use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of a felony. The Defendant's
degree of offense was already enhanced from a second degree felony robbery, U.C.A. §76-3-301, to
a first degree felony aggravated robbery, U.C.A. §76-3-302, based upon the use of the same
dangerous weapon. This double punishment resulted in a violation of the Appellant's right against
double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that the double jeopardy clause is designed
to "prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended."
Missouri v. Hunt 459 U.S. 359 (1983). Therefore, for the Court to properly analyze Appellant's
claim of double jeopardy, it must determine what the legislative intent was when they enacted the two
provisions. Albernaz v. United States. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
9

In enacting U.C. A. §76-6-203 in 1976, the legislature made its intention very clear. The Utah
Supreme Court as well as the Utah Court of Appeals have held that the previous statute did not
violate the double jeopardy clause, because the legislature intended a more severe sentence based
upon the specific type of weapon used. State v. Angus. 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978); State v. Speer.
750 P.2d 186, 192 (Utah 1988); State v. Drawn. 791 p.2d 890, 133 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Ct. App.
1990); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (Ct. App. 1990). In Angus, the Supreme
Court examined the legislative intent behind the enhancement statute and found that:
...the legislature has further determined that the use of some deadly weapons
are more dangerous than others. For instance, a pocket knife, a baseball bat,
or even a pencil, in some circumstances of use, may be a deadly weapon. But
the legislature has regarded the use of firearms as innately more dangerous
and therefore more deserving of punishment. For this reason it has provided,
by Sec. 76-3-203 quoted above, that for conviction of any felony by using a
firearm there shall be the additional penalty. (Emphasis added)

It is clear that in enacting the original statute, the legislature intended the statute to apply only
to those weapons that were inherently dangerous. Since the legislature intended to more severely
punish those who used firearms, as opposed to other dangerous weapons, the statute was upheld.
When the Legislature amended U.C. A. §76-6-302 to include all dangerous weapons in 1995,
they did not make their intentions clear. The statute passed through the Senate without debate or
question. (Recordings of Senate Debate, Day 45, February 29, 1995, 51st Legislative Session, Tape
48, Count 2114) In the House of Representatives, the only comment made was that the legislature
wanted to "broaden the ability of law enforcement to deal with violent crimes." (Recording of House
of Representative Debate, Day 44, February 28, 1995, 51st Legislative Session, A.M. session, Tape
1, Count 2309) These statements do not clearly represent that the legislature intended to provide dual
punishment for those persons convicted of aggravated offenses, especially those who already had their
10

sentence enhanced pursuant to other statutes. Viewing the fact that aggravated offenses are increased
a degree where there is use of a dangerous weapon, it seems unlikely that the legislature would again
punish those felons for use of a dangerous weapon. Were that the legislative intent, it should be
clearly reflected either in the statute or in the debates.
The legislative history of the prior statute makes it clear that the intent was to severely punish
those who used specific types of weapons. The Legislature felt that the use of a firearm justified
additional penalties. However, in amending the statute to include all dangerous weapons, the
legislature failed to make such a finding regarding dangerous weapons.
During the 1995 legislative session, little or no discussion was presented to make the
legislature's intention clear. Without clear evidencte to show that the legislature specifically intended
to create a double punishment for person convicted of aggravated offense, the statute must be
declared unconstitutional, because it violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States
Constitution and the Utah State Constitution.

POINT H
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO ALLOW A CAUTIONARY JURY
INSTRUCTION REQUESTED BY THE DEFENDANT
REGARDING ORAL ADMISSIONS
An appeal challenging the refusal to give a jury instruction presents a question of law with no
particular deference granted to the trial court's decision. Ong Int'l flJ.S.A.^ Inc. V. 11th Avenue
Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). An Appellate Court will review the trial court's instructions
under a correction of error standard. Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). Failure
to give requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error only if their omission tends to mislead
11

the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on
the law. Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Uth App. 1987).
The trial court committed error when it failed to give a complete jury instruction requested
by the Appellant. The Appellant requested the following instruction:
You are the exclusive judges as to whether the defendant made an
admission, and if so, whether such statement is true in whole or in part. If you
should find that the defendant did not make the statement you must reject it.
If you find that it is true in whole or in part, you may consider that part which
you find to be true.
Evidence of an oral statement of the defendant should be viewed with
caution. (CALJIC 2.71, 1995)
Instead of giving the instruction as requested, the trial court struck the last, and most crucial,
sentence.
The cautionary instruction requested by Appellant has been reviewed and found necessary
when oral admissions are admitted in other jurisdictions. State v. Swee. 51 Or. App. 249, 624 P.2d
1198 (1981); People v. Bemis. 33 Cal. 2d 395, 202 P.2d 82 (1949); People v. Pail. 22 Cal 2d 642,
140 P.2d 828 (1943).
However, this issue has only been superficially reviewed in Utah on two occasions. See State
v. Shabata. 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984) and State v. Hymas. 131 P.2d 791 (Utah 1942). The Shabata
court acknowledged that a cautionary instruction may have been appropriate in that case, but failed
to find error because the Appellant failed to provide the proposed instruction.
A "defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the crime if there is any
basis in the evidence to support that theory." State v. Brown. 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980), and
he is entitled to a cautionary instruction so long as it is not incorrect or misleadingly states the
material rule of the law. State v. Aly. 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Ct. App. 1989).
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The requested instruction was an accurate statement of the law, as the Court found in Hymas.
In Hymas. the Court acknowledged and upheld the jury instruction charging the jury to "receive with
great caution the written and oral statements attributed to defendant because of the dangers of
misstatements, misunderstandings, the infirmities of memory, etc., and the possibility of the
defendant's mind being oppressed and disturbed by his position." The Court in Hymas clearly found
that the proposed instruction "embraces a correct legal principle". The legal principle has not been
overturned or amended, and is still a correct statement of the law.
The tendency of a witness to misstate the defendant's statements, or to misunderstand the
defendant's statements and improperly convey them to the jury, require that a cautionary instruction
should be given. Although the court does not have an obligation to provide an instruction without
motion by a party, the trial court was required to give the instruction once it was proposed, so long
as it did not misstate the law. The court's failure to advise the jury to use caution when evaluating
the admission of the defendant prejudiced his case, and therefore requires reversal of the Defendant's
conviction.
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CONCLUSION
The Appellant was denied his right to be free of double jeopardy when he was twice sentenced
for the same oflfense. U.C. A. §76-3-203 should be found unconstitutional as it violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution.
The trial court's failure to give a jury instruction cautioning the jury regarding oral admissions
was in error. Further, that error prejudiced the Appellant, and mandates, that the Appellant's
conviction be reversed and remanded to the trial court to afford him a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <A-)

day of May, 1997.

Kent E. Snider
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the above and
foregoing Brief to the following:
Attorney General's Office
ATTN: Criminal Appeals
160 East 300 South, 6th floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
DATED t h i s ^ / day of May, 1997.

^

.r . « ^ ^ , r j

^

-Kent E. Snider
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM "A"
(TRIAL VOLUME I)

21

A.

Had bandanas around their face and a stocking

cap, and that's pretty much just how he was dressed.
Q.

Okay.

Could you tell what race that person was?

A.

I thought he was black when I saw him.

Q.

Okay.

Once you —

when he says, "get to the

back," is there only one way to get to the back?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

A.

Uh huh.

Q.

And did you come in contact with another

Did you go there?

individual who was not an employee?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

And did that person have a gun?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What kind of gun was it?

A.

It was like a handgun.

Q.

All right.

A.

Yes.

Q.

—

A.

Yes, it was.

Q.

And what happened once you got back in the area

It was different than, in fact

—

the other one; is that right?

where that person was?
A.

He told me to go to the office and kind of waved

the gun towards that way.
Q.

Okay.

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
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south side of the building?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What —- what happened or what was said that gave

you reason to bel ieve that there was an armed robbery
happening?
A.

They came —

men came in with guns.

Q.

Okay.

A.

And told us to get to the back.

Q.

How many men?

A.

Two.

Q.

And when you say they came in, do you know how

they came in?
A.

I believe it was through the west entrance, the

rear door.
Q.

All right.

Is that normally an employee entrance

or a delivery entrance?
A.

Yeah.

garbage.
Q.

It was only opened to take out the
The boys were taking out the garbage.

And do you recall approximately what time that

would have happened when you first find out that
there is an armed robbery, when these men had come
into the area?
A.

Around —

it was around 11:45.

Q.

Describe specifically as you can recall what you

saw and what you heard once the men came in.

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
/ *> *\ ^ \

What

41

did the person or persons say.
did —

Let's start with

did one person come to the area where you were

or did both of them?

The two men that you didn't

recognize or the two robbers.
A.

It was just one person that came forward up to

the drive-through register.
Q.

All right.

And what —

appear to you like?

what did that person

Could you tell that it was a

man?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

And could you tell approximately how

tall that person was?
A.

Yeah.

I can't remember right now though.

Q.

All right.

Did you give a statement shortly

after this?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And give estimates as to height, weight, and

those kinds of thing?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

Could you tell what the —

this

particular man's race was?
A.

He was African-American.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

Q.

What did that gun look like?

Did that person have a gun or a firearm?
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A.

A rifle-type of gun, light brown in color.

Q.

And about how far away were you from that person

when you could see that they had a rifle that was
light brown in color?
A.

You mean when he first came in?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Probably about five feet.

Q.

Okay.

A.

At the most.

Q.

Okay.

A little closer than perhaps you and I

are?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

All right.

And was there anything that blocked

or inhibited your ability to look at him as you're
looking at me?

Was there anything between the two of

you?
A.

Un uh.

Q.

What did that person say when they came into that

location with the gun in their hands?
A.

They told everything —

to the back, and kept on —
language.

he told everybody to get
he was using vulgar

And so everybody started filing back, and

he told me to come and open the cash register.
Q.

And what did you tell him or what did you do in

response to him wanting you to come and open the cash
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have a gun?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And what kind of gun was that, if you know?

A.

A handgun.

Q.

Did you go back out to the area and attempt to

get the cash register or the cash drawer for the
first person you dealt with?
A.

No.

Q.

Did some other employee go out there?

A.

Yes.

I went back and told them that they needed

to send someone up to open up the registers, and
Eric, the other manager that was working there, went
and —
Q.

Then what did you do?

A.

I went back with the other employees and got down

on the floor.
Q.

Okay.

Facedown on the floor?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

A.

(Nods head up and down.)

Q.

And where was that happening?

A.

It was in the place where there is a sink and the

Just crunched up in little balls.
Crunched up in a little ball?

manager's office.
Q.

All right.

So that was near where the manager's

office that Mandy would have been in; is that right?
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Q.

Do you recall whether or not —

were you, in

fact, working on the 16th of June?
A.

Yes, I was.

Q.

And do you recall what shift you were on?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What time does that start?

A.

At 9:00 p.m.

Q.

And ends?

A.

7:00 a.m.

Q.

Did you, in fact, Officer Felter, receive a

I worked the graveyard shift.

dispatch just prior to midnight on the 16th of June
of 1995 of a robbery that just occurred at Wendy's on
12th and Washington?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Is that within Ogden City jurisdictional limits?

A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

Where were you at when the call came in?

A.

I was right close to 12th and Washington.

Q.

How long after the —

receiving the dispatch were

you able to -- how much time did it take before you
arrived at Wendy's?
A.

Probably less than 30 seconds.

Q.

Were you alone when you arrived initially?

A.

Yes, I was.

Q.

And did other police officers arrive after that?
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Force in Salt Lake City.
Q.

And how long have you been in that assignment?

A.

Since May of 1995.

Q.

What education do you have, please?

A.

I have a four-year undergraduate degree, a BA,

and I also have a law degree.
Q.

When and where did you receive those?

A.

I received the undergraduate degree from

Youngstown State University in Ohio, and the law
degree from Case Western Reserve University in
Cleveland, Ohio.
Q.

You indicate you've been with the FBI for

approximately the past 10 years?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

When were you assigned in the Salt Lake office?

A.

In May of 1995.

Q.

Were you given a specific assignment shortly

thereafter being assigned to Salt Lake in June of
1995?
A.

Yes, I was.

Q.

What was that assignment?

A.

I was assigned to an undercover operation as an

undercover agent.

The operation was in effect in the

Ogden and Layton area, targeting the Ogden O.V.G.
street gang.
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Q.

And what —

when you say an operation, what is it

that you were trying to do or what was it you were
doing?
A.

We were trying to make criminal cases against the

various members of the O.V.G. street gang for their
criminal acts that were being committed in the Ogden
area.
Q.

And did —

what is it that —

was there something

that was actually set up for this operation?
A.

Yes, there was.

We had an undercover off-site in

Layton, Utah, that the various gang members believed
was a place of business where we would purchase
drugs, guns, stolen property, acting in an undercover
capacity.
Q.

All right.

When you say "acting in an undercover

capacity," you would portray yourself to be what?
A.

They believed I was a criminal, somebody who

wanted to purchase drugs and stolen property.
Q.

All right.

How long did that operation go on

for?
A.

It went on until November of 1995.

Q.

Calling your attention specifically to June 25th

of 1995, were you working in that undercover
operation on that date?
A.

Yes, I was.
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1

Q.

Did you have occasion on the 25th of June of 1995

2

to meet an individual who identified himself to you

3

as Ed Smith?

4

A.

Yes, I did.

5

Q.

Do you see that person in court?

6

A.

Yes, I do.

7

Q.

Please, identify him.

8

A.

The defendant sitting at the defense table with

9

the white shirt and maroon patterned tie.

10

Q.

All right.

To the immediate right of Mr. Gravis,

11

Mr. Gravis being in the dark blue jacket; is that

12

right?

13

A.

That's correct.

14

Q.

Had you met him prior to June 25th of 1995?

15

A . I

16

Q.

How did he identify himself to you?

17

A.

I knew who he was or what he was supposed to look

18

like, and he identified himself as Ed to me.

19

Q.

20

A . I

21

Q.

22

with him this day?

23

A.

24

assist in a criminal act which he was going to make

25

some money.

had not.

Where did you meet him?
met him at our undercover off-site in Layton.

And what was the reason that you were meeting

Mr. Smith believed that he was meeting with me to

The actual reason was to gain
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A.

This is.

2

Q.

Does it appear to be in the same condition today

3

as it was when you purchased it?

4

A.

Yes, it does.

5

Q.

Did it have a clip in it when you purchased it?

6

A.

No, it did not.

7

Q.

So you did not purchase it with ammunition?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

All right.

Other than checking it and making

10

sure it's unloaded, has it been changed or altered in

11

any way?

12

A.

No, it has not.

13

Q.

And where has it been stored since being

14

purchased in June of 1995?

15

A.

In a FBI evidence locker.

16

Q.

Thank you.

17

where?

18

A.

In the FBI building in Salt Lake City, Utah.

19

Q.

What did the defendant tell you —

20

testimony was someth ing - - his response to your

21

talking about it was that that job really sucked; is

22

that right?

23

A.

That's correct.

24

Q.

What —

25

defendant tell you, speciefically, about the Wendy4 s

That evidence locker is located

I believe your

after that statement, what did the

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.

68

robbery that he had done?
A.

He told me that he and Shane Searle had, on a

Friday night at about 11:45 p.m., went into the
Wendy's; that he, the defendant, was carrying an SKS
rifle; that Shane Searle was carrying a
nine-millimeter handgun.

That they went into the

Wendy's; that the defendant shouted:

Yo, this is a

robbery, let's not make it a murder.

That he ordered

everybody to the back of the store; that he cleared
the registers while Shane Searle held a
nine-millimeter to the head of the girl who was made
to open the safe and put the money into a bag.
That during the robbery, one of the employees
escaped and ran next door to a motel to try and use
the telephone to call the police.

And that they

—

when they exited, they found out later on that they
did not get as much money as they should have.
Q.

Were you aware of any of those specific facts

before the defendant told you about them?
A.

Other than that the Wendy's had been robbed, no,

I was not.
Q.

How much money did he claim that he got?

A.

He told me he got about four or $500.

Q.

And did he indicate to you whether or not Mr.

Searle's brother was involved in some way?
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A.

Yes.

He told me that Shanei Searle fs brother, Ran

Searle, was an employ ee at the Wendy's and that he
provided them informa tion necessary to perform the
robbery.
Q.

Okay.

During the course of your traveling

between Layton and Salt Lake City and having this
conversation, did you have some type of recording or
listening device activated and operating?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

What did you have?

A.

I had a body recorder, we call it, because it's a

recorder that we wear on our bodies, and it was
secreted in my boot.
Q.

Did it record for the entire time that the two of

you were together?
A.

Yes, it did.

Q.

And have you had an opportunity to take the tape

recording that was made from that and listen to it?
A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

Does it accurately record your conversations?

A.

Yes, it did.

Q.

What is the quality of that tape?

A.

Average to below average.

It's not real clear,

but you can hear the conversation.
Q.

Okay.

In fact, when you say secreted in your
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that you were present with Detective Minor on the 5th
of December of 1995.

Do you recall that?

A,

Yes, I do,

Q.

That you were present for the conversations

between the defendant and Detective Minor.

Do you

recall that?
A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

I did not specifically ask you what the defendant

said at that point.

Do you recall that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Mr. Gravis, in crossing Detective Minor, referred

to the statement that was taken as an alleged
conversation.

Did a conversation take place between

the defendant, Ed Smith, and Detective Minor?
A.

It certainly did, yes.

Q.

Did the defendant confess to Detective Minor?

A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

Did you remain there for whatever the time period

was of the conversation between the defendant and
Detective Minor?
A.

Yes, I was there for the entire period.

Q.

Were there periods of time where in response to

probing for specifics that the defendant would reply
something?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

What would he reply?

A.

A lot of times he would just reply yes or yeah or

affirmative-type responses, but without giving
details.
Q.

Okay.

Did he ever indicate, while you were

there, that he couldn't remember things?
A.

Yeah.

He said something about smoking a lot of

marijuana and it affected his memory.
Q.

All right.

something?
A.

Oh.

Q.

—

A.

Yeah.

In response to that, would you do

In response to his saying --

I don't remember?
I was —

I was trying to prod his memory.

I was giving him details that he had told me.
said:

I

Don't you remember telling me that, you know,

this happened at Wendy's or that happened at Wendy's?
Q.

What would his responses be to that?

A.

He'd say, yes, and sort of just leave it at that.

He wouldn't elaborate or give me any more details.
Q.

At any time while this defendant was talking to

Detective Minor in your presence, or talking with
you, did the defendant ever deny that he did the
robbery at Wendy's?
A.

No, he hasn't.

Q.

With Shane Searle?
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A.

He never denied it.

Q.

Did he ever indicate to you or to Detective Minor

that his prior conversation with you was puffing or
bragging or anything like that?
A.

No, he never said anything to that effect.

Q.

Did he ever name anyone else as the person who

had committed it?
A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

Who?

A.

He said himself and Shane Searle, and that Ran

Searle helped plan it.
Q.

All right.

Other than that, did he name anyone

else?
A.

No, he did not.
MR. HEWARD:

Thank you.

That's all.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. GRAVIS:
Q.

Was this alleged conversation recorded?

A.

No, it was not.

Q.

And why not, if you know?

A.

Our —

the FBI policy is we never record any

types of interviews or confessions of that type.
Q.

Why is that the policy of the FBI?

A.

I really couldn't tell you.

one we've been trained

It's just from day

—
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Q.

So it boils down to if the defendant denies that

a conversation occurred, it's your word against his?
A.

I don't think that's what it boils down to.

We

just tell what he said.
Q.

Okay.

But there was no written statement taken

from him?
A.

No, there was not.

Q.

And did you ask -- did you or Detective Minor ask

him to give a written statement?
A.

No, we did not.

Q.

Okay.

So -- but there was no recording, no

writing, no nothing to verify this conversation took
place, outside of your and Detective Minor's
testimony?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Okay.
MR. GRAVIS:

Nothing further.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. HEWARD:
Q.

Except your word and Detective Minor's word?

A.

That's what it boils down to.
MR. HEWARD:
THE COURT:

Thank you
You may step down.

AGENT EVANS:
MR. HEWARD:

Thank you, sir.
Could I just have a
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Facts.

Facts that support one and only one verdict,

guilty as charged, aggravated robbery.
THE COURT:

Would you swear the

bailiff, please?
(WHEREUPON, the bailiff is sworn and
acknowledges.)
THE COURT:

Okay, folks.

(WHEREUPON, at this time the jury leaves the
courtroom.)
THE COURT:

Do you want to make a

record now on the objections to the jury
instructions?
MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:
MR. GRAVIS:

Yes, Your Honor.
Go right ahead.
I didn't go through the

numbers with you, so I don't recall the numbers.

A

couple of them I do have.
Well, I'll make a record of —

of the one

dealing with the defendant's admission or confession.
THE COURT:
MR. GRAVIS:

Right.
And I'd specifically

requested that the last sentence that the Court
struck:

Evidence of an oral admission —

indicated in chambers —

or as I

oral statement of the

defendant should be viewed with caution.
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THE COURT:

Mr. Smith, in order for

me to proceed with sentencing on all of the cases,
you understand that you'll have to give up your right
to delay on the Theft charge and on the Escape and
Damaging Jail Property.

You understand that you're

entitled to have those matters stayed at least 48
hours, and no longer than 45 days.

Usually, that's

for the purpose of getting a presentence report.

But

you understand, if you want me to proceed on
sentencing on those today, you'll have to waive that
time.
MR. SMITH:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Is that what you want to

MR. SMITH:

That's what I want to

THE COURT:

All right.

do?

do.
You may

proceed then,
MR. GRAVIS:

Yes, Your Honor.

As

far as the multiple cases, they just address the
aggravated robbery recommendation.

There is a

recommendation for five to life which, I guess since
Mr. Smith is already in prison, I don't have a whole
lot to say about that, except they're recommending it
consecutive to the zero to five.
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Mr. Smith, prior to this aggravated robbery,
has, I believe, six or seven misdemeanor convictions,
no prior felonies.

The felony he's presently serving

time on out of Davis County actually occurred after
the robbery, but it was resolved prior to the robbery
charge simply because, as the Court is well aware,
Mr. Smith changed attorneys a few times and things
like that that caused some problems and delayed this
case in getting resolved first.
So we'd submit that the —

the recommendation

that this five to life run consecutive to the zero to
five he's already serving is inappropriate, just
that —

but for the way things happened, Mr. Smith

would have been sentenced on this one first.

I don't

see any indication whether the Court down in Davis
County had recommended there that they didn't want
anything to run concurrent with their sentence.
So, first off, we'd ask the Court not to
sentence him consecutive to the zero to five he's
already serving.
More importantly, on the issue of the
dangerous weapon enhancement, which we —

we filed an

objection to the dangerous weapon enhancement being
imposed in this case and the State responded by way
of memorandum.

It's our position that the statute,

Laurie S h i n g l e ,
•a m ^

C.S.R.

TQQ-ARi n

1

as amended in April of 1995, where the language was

2

changed making it an enhancement for —

3

from firearm to a dangerous weapon in the enhancement

4

statute, is it's simply a repetition of the

5

aggravating factor which made this a first degree

6

aggravated robbery from a robbery charge, and that is

7

double jeopardy.

8
9

changed it

Aggravated robbery, as defined in what Mr.
Smith was convicted of, was he committed a robbery

10

and used a dangerous weapon.

11

convicted of is committing a robbery with a dangerous

12

weapon, making it an Aggravated Robbery, First Degree

13

Felony, rather than a second degree.

14

impose the further enhancement for Use of a Dangerous

15

Weapon, I submit it's being punished twice for the

16

same act, using a dangerous weapon in the commission

17

of a robbery; and, therefore, it is our position that

18

constitutes double jeopardy.

19

So that's what he was

And then to

Now, prior to the amendment, the Utah Supreme

20

Court and the Court of Appeals had ruled that the

21

firearm enhancement did not constitute double

22

jeopardy, and in my memorandum I specifically cited

23

some language from the State versus Webb case where

24

they indicated that the legislature could find the

25

use of a firearm, or facsimile, was a more ominous
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threat than the use of any —

a different —

other

type of dangerous weapons; and, therefore, that's why
it was not double jeopardy because it was firearm as
differentiated from other types of dangerous weapons.
But the language changed in April of 1995

—

that went into effect in April of 1995, they redid to
both an aggravated robbery and the enhancement;
therefore, it's being twice punished for the same -same act, that's using a dangerous weapon in a
robbery.
THE COURT:
MR. HEWARD:

Okay.
Your Honor, I'll

address the issues in the -- essentially the same
order as Mr. Gravis did.
We do not have an objection to Mr. Smith being
sentenced on the offenses that he's pled into today;
however, there is restitution on each of those.

I

have an itemized listing of the restitution on the
destruction of jail property that certainly Mr.
Gravis and Mr. Smith can have a copy.
breakdown, as well as the total.

It gives a

The total amount in

order to repair and replace the items that he damaged
is $1,169 even.

That breaks out in both labor and

materials at approximately $760 in labor and the
remainder in materials.
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On the issue on the stolen vehicle on Mr.
Daines' case, I —
total.

I cannot give the Court an exact

There are some forms that have been

attached —

that have been attached from Clarence and

Kathy Jones, which were the owners of the 1991 Nissan
Pathfinder.

It appears that the vehicle that was

stolen was insured through Farmer's Insurance
Exchange, and they have listed an itemized attachment
for not only the vehicle, but all of the items that
were —

is this the stuff that was in it or the stuff

that was taken in the burglary of the home?
(Off-the-record discussion.)
MR. HEWARD:

Maybe the best thing

would be to do, Your Honor, in talking to Mr. Daines,
who had that case, is just ask you to leave
restitution open and we will attempt to -- rather
than —

with there not being a presentence report, if

we could have about 3 0 or 4 5 days, we'll come up with
a figure, submit that to Mr. Gravis, submit that to
the Court, or you can leave it to the Board of
Pardons, whichever you prefer.
MR. GRAVIS:
can -- Mr.

Your Honor, maybe we

Smith has indicated he wants a

restitution hearing on —

on the one matter.

MR. HEWARD:

On the jail matter?
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So we could set that

MR. GRAVIS:
for the same time.
MR. HEWARD:

That's fine.

MR. DAINES:

That's even better.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. HEWARD:

Okay.

On the issues,

Your Honor, Mr. Gravis filed a brief and we
responded, and I will assume that the Court had the
benefit of our response and will not necessarily go
back over each and every item.

However, as we did

line out for Your Honor, the specific issue that Mr.
Gravis raises today has been previously raised, has
been previously briefed from both sides, only when
there is a little different language, when the
language was firearm in the robbery or agg robbery
statute, and firearm in the penalty enhancement
section.

While Mr. Gravis claims that this is

different now by using —

going to a dangerous

weapon, he doesn't tell the Court how it's different,
or how the analysis that the Court follows is any
different.
In the three cases that are cited, the Drawn
decision, the Webb decision, and the Russell
decision, these exact same arguments are raised and
they are all handled in the exact same way.
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The

20

Court comes back and says:
jeopardy.

This is not double

This is nothing other than a penalty

enhancement.
The legislature has determined that we are
going to punish all felons who use a firearm
in

—

in the three decisions.

The only thing the

legislature did when they changed that language is
broadened the class.

The analysis is no different.

They simply looked at it, in my opinion, from the
State's opinion, and simply said:

We are not going

to simply limit the penalty enhancement to just those
who use firearms because someone who is threatened
with a knife or who is threatened with another weapon
is just in the similar or same position where they
are being exposed to more danger, where people who go
out and commit the crimes and who are armed with
dangerous weapons are, in fact, creating a likelihood
of a much more serious situation happening.
Simply look at that and it's interesting, if
you read the three decisions, pre-1975, the statute
talked about dangerous weapons for purposes of the
agg robbery.

In '75, they changed to firearms, and

then in '95, they went back to dangerous weapons.
I'm not exactly sure why the legislature vacillates
between one or the other.
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1

But the bottom line is this is not a situation

2

where Mr. Smith is being twice put in jeopardy for

3

the same offense.

4

cases are very, very specific in addressing that

5

issue and saying, the legislature has simply

6

determined that we are going to punish people more

7

severely when they fall into this particular

8

class, which the defendant clearly does.

9

clearly returned the verdict indicating he had used a

10

The statutes —

I'm sorry, the

The jury

firearm.

11

The fact of the matter is is that the

12

legislature gives Your Honor some additional

13

direction in that they want those sentences

14

enhancements to be consecutive, and not concurrent,

15

and gives you discretion in determining whether or

16

not that would be for one year or for an additional

17

zero to five.

18

Based upon all those reasons, Your Honor, as

19

set out in our memorandum, it is our position that

20

the change does not change anything that has

21

previously been argued in both the Utah Supreme Court

22

and the Utah Court of Appeals, nor is there anything

23

lined out in the defense's brief that would indicate

24

that that is the case.

25

It is our position, therefore, obviously, that
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1

But the bottom line is this is not a situation

2

where Mr. Smith is being twice put in jeopardy for

3

the same offense.

4

cases are very, very specific in addressing that

5

issue and saying, the legislature has simply

6

determined that we are going to punish people more

7

severely when they fall into this particular

8

class, which the defendant clearly does.

9

clearly returned the verdict indicating he had used a

10

The statutes —

I'm sorry, the

The jury

firearm.

11

The fact of the matter is is that the

12

legislature gives Your Honor some additional

13

direction in that they want those sentences

14

enhancements to be consecutive, and not concurrent,

15

and gives you discretion in determining whether or

16

not that would be for one year or for an additional

17

zero to five.

18

Based upon all those reasons, Your Honor, as

19

set out in our memorandum, it is our position that

20

the change does not change anything that has

21

previously been argued in both the Utah Supreme Court

22

and the Utah Court of Appeals, nor is there anything

23

lined out in the defense's brief that would indicate

24

that that is the case.

25

It is our position, therefore, obviously, that

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.

22

1

Your Honor should, and the law allows that, in fact,

2

there be a penalty enhancement for his use of the

3

firearm.

4

On the issue, specifically, on what this

5

defendant's sentence should be, it is the State's

6

position that his Aggravated Robbery conviction

7

should, in fact, be a consecutive sentence.

8

primary reason for that, Your Honor, is that this

9

defendant has shown an incredible pattern of conduct

And the

10

over a period of time.

11

misdemeanors.

12

are, they are aggravated assaults that were amended

13

down; they were carrying concealed weapons.

14

were situations like that where the defendant is

15

showing you a propensity for violence.

16

Mr. Gravis says he only has

If you look at what those misdemeanors

They

Beyond that, when he is out there and

17

committing the agg robbery —

18

found that he did —

19

into a public restaurant with an assault weapon in

20

his hands and start ordering and threatening people

21

in such a situation, or in such a manner, that those

22

type of crimes mandate the very toughest sentence

23

that the courts can impose.

24
25

that the jury clearly

he chose to interject himself

Beyond that, there's an additional factor that
I think the Court needs to be aware of.
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Calling your

1

attention back to the testimony of Special Agent Bob

2

Evans —

3

something that was testified to because for purposes

4

of the determination of guilt or innocence, it is not

5

something that was relevant,

6

Mr. Gravis has a copy of this and it wasn't

During the course of this defendant talking to

7

Mr. Evans and being tape-recorded about how he had

8

committed this crime, he also starts talking about

9

other individuals that he is upset at, specifically,

10

an individual who shot him, and how when that

11

individual gets out of jail or out of prison, how he

12

is, in fact, going to get him.

13

taking this fact that he has been shot very personal

14

and that he is going to return the favor, if you

15

will, and impose upon him the same thing that this

16

defendant indicates that he did to the defendant.

17

How is he, in fact,

The bottom line is, Your Honor, is that this

18

is an individual who I'm not sure ever is going to be

19

in a position where —

20

he's ever going to be in a position where he should

21

ever be outside of the walls of the Utah State

22

Prison.

23

propensity for violence.

24

crimes you can commit, and his history indicates that

25

he's done it in the past.

where the State believes that

He has gang affiliations, he shows a
He commits the most serious

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
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1

For all of those reasons, it would be our

2

position that his five to life should run consecutive

3

to everything else that he is doing, and that it will

4

be Your Honor's determination of whether or not the

5

additional penalty would be for one year or for a

6

zero to five.

7
8

MR. GRAVIS:

approach the bench and borrow one of the your Codes?

9
10

Your Honor, may I

THE COURT:

Sure.

(Off-the-record discussion.)

11

MR. GRAVIS:

First off, in response

12

to Mr. Heward, Mr. —

13

Smith's prior record.

14

assaults being reduced to class A misdemeanors.

15

never been charged with an aggravated assault and had

16

it reduced.

17

assault.

18

he incorrectly stated Mr.
It shows no aggravated

He's never been charged with aggravated

He was charged with two previous felonies, but

19

neither one of them were aggravated assaults.

20

were both dismissed.

21

So —

22

(Mr. Gravis looks at Utah Code.)

23

He's

They

and let me find the section.

MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, Mr. Heward

24

indicates that the aggravated robbery was amended in

25

1995 to change the language.

It was amended —

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.

the

25

statute, as it currently reads, was amended in 1994.
It says, use of a dangerous weapon.
recall —

And I can't

and I don't have the cases here.

looking through them when I cited them.

I was

I believe it

said dangerous weapon back when these other cases
were decided.

I don't think that language has been

changed.
But clearly, since 1995, the enhancement
statute was changed from firearm to use of a
dangerous weapon, and I submit that it's our position
that that is a difference, that the robbery statute
said:

use of a dangerous weapon makes it an

aggravated robbery.

I believe that's the case where

it's always been that way for several years.
But the use of a firearm -- the changing from
the use of a firearm to use of a dangerous weapon in
April of 1995 is a significant change since those
cases have been decided because the language is the
same:

Uses a dangerous weapon in a robbery, because

an aggravated robbery -- the enhancement is another
enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon.

Doesn't

matter whether it's a gun, knife or whatever in the
new statute, where in the old statute, it's a
firearm.
So we submit that it's inappropriate.

Laurie Shincrle,
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2

1

THE COURT:

Well, let me ask —

2

one concern, Mr. Gravis.

3

correctness of your position and —

4

of the argument, anyway —

5

firearm.

6

can take advantage of more general language?

just

Assuming, you know, the
for the purpose

in this case it was a

And are you really in a position where you

7

MR. GRAVIS:

I think so, yes, Your

8

Honor, because it's more general language.

9

changed the law.

It's not —

They

if they wanted to leave

10

it a firearm, they could have left it that way.

11

they changed it to all dangerous weapons as an

12

enhancement, then they're all classified together.

13

It doesn't matter whether it's a firearm or a

14

baseball bat.

15

any of them brings in the enhancements.

16

them also makes them a robbery and aggravated

17

robbery.

18

They're all enhancements.

When

The use of
The use of

I would submit though probably the legislature

19

didn't consider that.

They don't consider a lot of

20

things when they pass —

21

may want to change it back, but as it states right

22

now, I'd submit that the law cannot —

23

impose the dangerous weapon enhancement when you've

24

already aggravated it from a second degree to a first

25

degree because of the use of a dangerous weapon.

change statutes.
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you cannot

27

MR. HEWARD:

What that ignores, Your

Honor, is that when the statutes were challenged in
the three cases, the language on the penalty
enhancement said "firearm," and the language in the
robbery statute said "firearm."

Now the language in

the robbery statute says "dangerous weapon," and the
language in the penalty enhancement says "dangerous
weapon."
THE COURT:

I see your point.

Oh,

okay.
MR. HEWARD:
difference.

So there is no

They changed -- there's changes in both

of the applicable statute.
In regards to Mr. Gravis7 saying I misstated
it, I do apologize.

I said "aggravated assault."

The defendant wasn't charged with aggravated assault.
He was charged with attempted homicide.
for that.

I apologize

That was in 8-20 of 1993, and it appears

by guilty plea, he was convicted of threatening with
a weapon, a Misdemeanor, Class A, but he was charged
with attempted homicide.
Also, specifically, Your Honor
MR. GRAVIS:
to object.

—

Your Honor, I'm going

Mr. Heward is reading things that are not

included in the presentence report.

T.aurie Shinqle, C.S.R.

If he's
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1

interjecting something that I haven't seen, I would

2

like a chance to look at it.

3

MR. HEWARD:

I am reading off of the

4

OR sheet and the attached Utah Criminal History

5

Record, which Mr. Gravis had a copy of because it was

6

provided in anticipation of trial.

7

that was provided to him as far as discovery goes.

8
9
10

MR. GRAVIS:
yes, I agree.

It was something

I would have had that,

I was going off the presentence

report.

11

MR. HEWARD:

As to the other things

12

that I cited to, in June of '93 there was another

13

concealed weapon offense that was amended to a

14

threatening with a weapon, and there was an

15

additional —

16

there was —

there was a riot arrest in 1994 that
does not show a judicial outcome on.

17

Then there was interfering with arrest,

18

possession of a deadly weapon, felony, again in 1994,

19

where the charge appears to have been dismissed, at

20

least on the possession charge.

21

there may have been a conviction.

22

There was.

23

concealed weapon in 1994.

It doesn't show

—

I can't tell.

There was a conviction of carrying a

24

And then there was the obstruction of police,

25

Misdemeanor B, that the defendant was also convicted

Laurie Shingle, C.S.R.
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1

of in 1994; and then a couple of other arrests in '95

2

that it does not show the judicial outcome on.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HEWARD:

5

THE COURT:
Gravis?

It was

Anything further, Mr.

You should have the last word.

8
9

I misspoke.

attempted homicide, not aggravated assault.

6
7

Okay.

MR. GRAVIS:

Well,

Your Honor, I

would state that I don't believe that the statute

10

was changed —

11

changed in 1995, as Mr. Heward has indicated, to the

12

use of a dangerous weapon.

13

language at the time of these other cases was the

14

same as it is now; therefore, there is a difference.

15

the language.

It certainly wasn't

And I believe the

THE COURT:

Okay.

If I understand

16

correctly the present provision, the Court has the

17

option of —

18

is the statutory penalty.

19

firearm enhancement -- the dangerous weapon

20

enhancement at this point —

21

a one-year, minimum mandatory, in essence,

22

consecutive, or a zero to five.

well, obviously, the five to life, which
And if I proceed with the

23

MR. HEWARD:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. HEWARD:

that I can either impose

Correct.
In the alternative.
That's correct.
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3

1
2

MR. GRAVIS:

That's correct, Your

MR. HEWARD:

The statute doesn't

Honor.

3
4

read that clearly, but I believe that's what the

5

cases have told us.

6
7

THE COURT:

As a matter of fact, the

Supreme Court in my case told me.

8

MR. HEWARD:

Yes, I think so.

9

THE COURT:

And they made that

10

sufficiently clear in the other aggravated robbery

11

situation we have coming back.

12

MR. HEWARD:

13

THE COURT:

Yeah.
All right.

Mr. Smith,

14

on the charge of Aggravated Robbery, it's the order

15

of the Court that you be committed to prison for a

16

period of not less than five years and may be for as

17

much as life.

18

impose a consecutive zero to five years as a firearm

19

enhancement —

20

The Court is, in addition, going to

or deadly weapon enhancement.

The Court believing that I have achieved,

21

basically, with that what I'd need to achieve, has no

22

objection with that sentence running concurrently

23

with the previous zero to five out of Davis County.

24

In other words, I think it would be kind of stacking

25

it on to give him a zero to five consecutive on the
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